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How Vulnerable Are U.S. Power Plants?

An attack or takeover of a power plant has been a long-held fear for this country, a fear particularly focused on nuclear plants. Exactly how secure or how vulnerable are our power plants?



Protection of the United States’ critical infrastructure and hazardous facilities — particularly nuclear power plants and chemical plants — against terrorist attacks is an absolute must. In his January 2002 State of the Union speech, President Bush said that U.S. forces “found diagrams of American nuclear power plants” in al-Qaeda materials in Afghanistan. An al-Qaeda training manual lists nuclear plants as among the best targets for spreading fear in the U.S.

Experts say that an attack on a nuclear power plant, all of which in the U.S. are guarded by private security forces hired by the plants and supervised by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), couldn’t lead to a nuclear explosion, according to the nonpartisan Council of Foreign Relations. The danger, they say, is that attackers could cause a meltdown or a fire or set off a major conventional explosion, all of which could spew radiation into nearby cities and towns.

Currently, there are 103 operating commercial nuclear reactors producing electricity in the U.S., located at 64 sites in 31 states.

And indeed, hundreds of new U.S. power plants are planned in the next few years, reported Industry Week last Friday. “They include coal-fired, gas-fired, a solar electric power plant in Nevada and others fueled by renewable resources. Even nuclear has rejoined the conversation when it comes to power generation, although when and whether it ever translates into new power plants in the United States remains uncertain.” (Start-up construction of a new nuclear power plant hasn’t occurred in this country in 32 years.)

The government has taken some action to ensure nuclear power plants remain safe:

• U.S. nuclear power plants are built to withstand hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes and small plane crashes. Their “containment walls” are typically made of two to five feet of reinforced concrete with an interior steel lining.
• In February 2002, the NRC issued an advisory to the nation’s 103 nuclear power plants that terrorists might try to fly hijacked planes into some of them. And eight governors have independently ordered the National Guard to protect nuclear reactors in their states.
• Generally, plants are protected by fences, intrusion-detection devices, barriers and armed private security forces hired by the power plants’ operators. The private companies that run the plants are also legally required to plan for emergencies, including evacuation scenarios.

Consider, however, an article last week from the Associated Press (via Forbes) that reported “a government defense plan for nuclear power plants assumes an attack would come from less than half the number of Sept. 11 hijackers and they wouldn’t be armed with rocket-propelled grenades or other weapons often used by terrorists overseas.”

According to critics of the largely classified, AP-reported security document, such assumptions could make plants vulnerable to a terrorist takeover.

Sources, which include various congressional investigators, private watchdog groups and NRC-accessible industry representatives, say the defense plan assumes an attack force of roughly double the number that had been used in government planning before the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. At that time, plants were required to anticipate no more than four adversaries, including an “insider” accomplice. Nineteen al-Qaida terrorists were involved in the 9/11 attacks.

Expressing concern that the upgraded defense plan falls well short, attorneys general from seven states — which together have 31 of the nation’s 103 commercial power reactors — wrote the NRC last year saying that the agency “should require defense attacks […] by groups at least as large as that involved in the 9/11 attacks.”

The commission rejected staff recommendations to require guard forces at reactors to be capable of defending against rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), powerful “platter explosive charges capable of penetrating six feet of concrete, homemade torpedoes, and .50-caliber armor-piercing ammunition. These NRC decisions were confirmed by industry and congressional sources familiar with the deliberations on the defense plan.

The nuclear industry says most of the requirements already have been implemented and that nuclear power plants are much more secure than other potential terrorist targets such as chemical plants.

“We feel pretty good on balance that we have the right level or protection,” says Steven Floyd, vice president for regulatory affairs at the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry lobbying group.

Overall, the industry says it has spent about $1.2 billion on better defenses and more guards at its 64 reactor sites in 31 states since the al-Qaida attacks in 2001.

As for chemical plants, protection is just as hazy. According to the New York Times, in late December 2005, “more than four years after the Sept. 11 attacks, Congress has still not acted to make chemical plants, one of the nation’s greatest terrorist vulnerabilities, safer.”

The NY Times continued:

If terrorists attacked a chemical plant, the death toll could be enormous. A single breached chlorine tank could, according to the Department of Homeland Security, lead to 17,500 deaths, 10,000 severe injuries and 100,000 hospitalizations. Many chemical plants have shockingly little security to defend against such attacks.

As such, Senators Susan Collins, a Maine Republican, and Joseph Lieberman, a Connecticut Democrat, two months ago unveiled a bipartisan chemical plant security bill that “requires chemical plants to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop security and emergency response plans.” Further, the Department of Homeland Security would be required to develop performance standards for chemical plant security. In extreme cases, plants that do not meet the standards could be shut down.

A leading antiterrorism expert, according to the New York Times, has described the nation’s chemical plants as “15,000 weapons of mass destruction littered around the United States.”

References/Resources

Report Profiles Nuclear-Plant Attackers
by H. Josef Hebert
The Associated Press (via Forbes), Feb. 22, 2006

Time for Chemical Plant Security
New York Times (Select), Dec. 27, 2005

Energy: New Plants, Old Problems
by Jill Jusko
Industry Week, published: Feb. 24, 2006

Nuclear Facilities: Could terrorists target U.S. nuclear power plants?
Council on Foreign Affairs

Resources

Emergency Preparedness for Business: Facility Protection
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

Nuclear Plant Safety
PBS series, NOW

Protecting Chemical Plants from Catastrophic Failures, Part 1
by William Wayman
Security Info. Watch, Feb. 10, 2005

Protecting Chemical Plants from Catastrophic Failures, Part 2
by William Wayman
Security Info. Watch, March 16, 2005

Are You Ready? Nuclear Power Plants
FEMA, Jan. 28, 2005

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Comments:
  • February 28, 2006

    Our nation’s energy infrastructure is an attractive target for terrorism and could be difficult to protect, as your article suggests. All the evidence needed can be found in Iraq and their country’s struggle to restore and maintain the infrastructure needed to deliver oil to the world markets in the face of constant terrorist attacks.

    You’ll note, however, that the terrorists generally try to attack targets that are more vulnerable and difficult to protect than nuclear reactors. Therefore, it is imperative that threats to all critical infrastructure are considered in the competition for security spending, especially at the state and local levels.

    Certainly, you have captured several of the most hazardous potential security threats. Other significant threats exist in the form of attacks on food, water, engineered structures and transportation assets. The probability of these attacks is greater because these assets are more difficult to secure, making the chances of a successful attack greater.

    The amount of funding currently available to local communities is limited and generally goes mostly to the eight largest cities in the U.S., leaving security preparations for threats to other cities or infrastructure underfunded.

    An excellent example, cited by the New York Times on February 6, 2006, is the funding for avian flu preparations, which amounts to $7.1 billion. At first glance, this would seem like sufficient funding, but when “divided across 5,000 health departments, it’s only $70,000 each,” according Dr. Jeffery S. Duchin, who is quoted from the article titled ‘States and Cities Lag in Bird Flu Readiness.’ So, only about $350 million of the appropriated funds actually trickle down to the local health departments.

    The amount of funding provided to state and local governments in the 2005 Department of Homeland Defense budget was even less, coming in at only $4 billion, according to the DHS public website at http://www.dhs.gov. In order to receive government grants, each locality must have plans detailing responses to emergencies of all types. But given the amount of overhead implied in the avian bird flu case above, the development of the plans may, in fact, cost as much or more than the grants are worth, not including any implementation costs.

    There is no easy answer, but state-level administration is the key to protecting assets outside of the Federal umbrella. Simply allocating money using a per capita funding model is probably not sufficient. Consideration must be given to the types of threats and existing vulnerabilities when making decisions on where to allocate limited resources. State-level planners must be given adequate resources to support local governments in this process to avoid wasting money at the local level on unecessary or duplicative efforts and opening up windows of opportunity for attack.


  • March 1, 2006

    Decentralized local generation of electricity, energy production, energy storage, and energy distribution is safe from terrorism. Local solar generation coupled with annually renewable, local grown whole kernel shelled corn energy is safe, clean, cost effective and readily available. The infrastructure is in place [...]


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